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Governments face a fundamental dilemma when
asking expert groups for advice. Experts possess knowl-
edge that can help governments design effective and
legitimate policies. However, they can also propose dif-
ferent policies than those preferred by government.
How do governments solve this conundrum? Through
a mixed-methods study, the article examines politico-
administrative control with expert advisory commis-
sions in Norway. Arguing that both politicians and
bureaucrats can take interest in limiting the gap
between political/administrative policy preferences and
expert group output, the article examines by what
means they seek to control expert groups and how con-
trol varies across policy portfolios. It finds that while
politicians rely on control by design, bureaucrats use
both design and interventions. Moreover, political
and bureaucratic controls are stronger in the area of
financial/economic policy than elsewhere. The arti-
cle makes a novel contribution to scholarship at the
intersection of public administration and knowledge
and policymaking.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
In response to the coronavirus pandemic, many governments have set up task forces composed
of virologists, epidemiologists, economists, and other experts to provide advice on how to tackle
the crisis. This is only the latest example of the broader reliance of governments on external
expertise in the formulation of public policies. Policymakers at the national and international
level make extensive use of expert bodies for advice in day-to-day policymaking. Examples
include the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and other science panels advising
the United Nations (Haas, 2017), the European Commission's sprawling system of expert groups
(Gornitzka & Sverdrup, 2011), and ad hoc advisory commissions and task forces used in the
development of policy by many national governments (Marier, 2009; Rowe & McAllister, 2006).
Yet, decision makers face a fundamental dilemma when asking expert groups and commis-
sions for advice. On the one hand, experts possess knowledge that can help governments design
policies that more effectively address societal problems. Drawing on external experts can also
increase the credibility and legitimacy of policies, by signaling that policies are based on neutral
and independent expertise rather than partisan interests. On the other hand, it carries consider-
able political risks. Expert groups may challenge the government's definition of the problem
and recommend different policy solutions than those preferred by the government. While con-
cerns about policy effectiveness and legitimacy warrant that expert groups conduct their inqui-
ries independently and without government intervention, concerns that expert advice will
conflict with government preferences point to the need to control these groups.
How do governments solve this conundrum? The issue is not systematically addressed in
existing scholarship on knowledge and policymaking. Literature on “knowledge utilization”
argues that politicians often use expertise and science as tactical, strategic and political tools
(Boswell, 2008), but has not looked more closely at how governments seek to control expert
advice. And whereas work on “policy advisory systems” highlights that different advisory actors
vary in their exposure to political control (Craft & Howlett, 2013), it has left control of external
advisory input largely unexplored. Moreover, while specific studies of expert groups and com-
missions point out that advisory bodies are often subjected to government control strategies and
strategic considerations (Hunter & Boswell, 2015; Rowe & McAllister, 2006), this work typically
relies on case-studies of one or a few commissions that cannot necessarily be generalized across
policy areas or commission systems at large.
In this article, we attempt to fill this lacuna, both theoretically and empirically, by asking:
By what means and under what conditions are expert groups subjected to control by their politico-
administrative principals?
Extending insights from scholarship on delegation and on bureaucratic politics, we make
the following arguments. First, we argue that expert advisory groups in effect face two princi-
pals with incentives to exert control: the elected government and the permanent administra-
tion. Second, we argue that politicians and bureaucrats are likely to choose different control
strategies: We expect politicians to control expert groups mostly by design (ex ante control
strategies) rather than by ex post interventions that have high legitimacy costs, whereas
bureaucrats resort more to ex post control since bureaucratic interventions in expert group
work carry lower legitimacy costs. Third, we expect both political and bureaucratic control of
expert groups to vary across policy areas. As the political risks of consulting expert groups
are likely to vary with the salience of the policy portfolio, we expect stronger political control
of expert bodies in salient fields, whereas bureaucratic control is likely to vary with the
strength of the ministry.
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Our propositions are examined through a mixed-methods study of Norwegian ad hoc advi-
sory commissions. In a two-step quantitative/qualitative analysis (Hendren et al., 2018), we
combine qualitative interviews with 26 civil servants and academics with an original data set of
more than 400 advisory commissions—containing a total of 4000 members and 1400
secretaries—active in the period 1990–2017. We use the semi-structured interviews to map the
forms and policy area variation of politico-administrative control, before examining statistically
whether these observations can be corroborated at the aggregate level.
Our analysis shows that politicians primarily seek to limit preference divergence by control-
ling commissions' design—for example, by narrowing the terms of reference and selecting
experts based on partisan rationales—and very seldom intervene in the work of expert groups.
Bureaucrats also rely on control by design, but in addition actively intervene in expert group
work, through participation in the commission secretariat or in the commission itself. More-
over, we find that both politicians and bureaucrats are more eager to control commissions that
are appointed by the finance ministry, whereas groups under the culture ministry are controlled
less than commissions under other ministries.
The article makes theoretical, methodological, and empirical contributions to the literature.
First, it puts forward an original theoretical argument about the relationships between politi-
cians, bureaucrats and expert groups, which lie at the center of much contemporary pol-
icymaking. Second, our study responds to calls for rigorous mixed-methods research in public
administration, showing the added value of closely integrating quantitative and qualitative ana-
lyses when investigating these relationships. Third, we contribute with new and systematic
empirical insights into the relationship between expert bodies and their principals, which point
to a fertile terrain for empirical research at the intersection of public administration and knowl-
edge and policymaking.
The article is structured as follows: In the next sections, we review existing literature on
control of expert advice and then present our theoretical argument and expectations. In the fol-
lowing parts, we present the empirical context and the research design. We thereafter present
the results of the qualitative and quantitative analysis. In the conclusion, we discuss the impli-
cations and generalizability of our findings.
2 | PREVIOUS RESEARCH AND PERSPECTIVES
Politicians rely on input from experts of various sorts. These experts are found in a range of dif-
ferent institutions, located inside, outside, and at the fringe of government. On the one hand,
there are the in-house experts that provide politicians with day-to-day advice and information:
bureaucrats located in ministerial departments, agencies and other parts of the central adminis-
tration. On the other hand, you have the “outsiders”: policy experts that work in external
knowledge institutions such as consultancy firms, think tanks, and universities.
This article concerns expert bodies that are located somewhere in the middle, that is, expert
groups, commissions, and task forces appointed by government but that include outside experts.
These are consultative bodies, appointed on a permanent or temporary basis. They have the
task of providing governments with analysis, knowledge, and policy recommendations, or as
the European Commission writes about expert groups: “Although the Commission has consid-
erable in-house expertise, it needs specialist advice from outside experts as a basis for sound pol-
icymaking”.1 While such bodies are mandated by, designed by and report to government, they
also include external experts—such as academics and researchers—whose primary
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organizational affiliation and socialization is outside of the permanent government structures.
As such, expert groups and commissions are neither clearly positioned inside nor outside the
administration (Bressers et al., 2017, p. 1190).
As explained above, decision makers may have good reasons to seek to control this kind of
expert bodies. Yet, government control of expert groups has received surprisingly little attention
in scholarship on knowledge and expert advice in policymaking. Research on “policy advisory
systems” (PAS) has for example established that governments increasingly make use of non-
government policy advisors in policymaking (Craft & Howlett, 2013). Yet, while this literature
has discussed government control over in-house bureaucratic policy advice, it has paid little
attention to whether governments attempt to control advisory groups with external participa-
tion. Similarly, knowledge utilization research (Radaelli, 1999; Weiss, 1979) has pointed to
inherent tensions in the relationship between experts and policymakers and argued that politi-
cal actors may use expert knowledge for political-strategic reasons. Politicians may request sci-
entific advice to substantiate policy, dismiss expert advice if it is too far from their policy
preferences, and cherry-pick information that resonates with their worldviews (Boswell, 2008;
Schrefler, 2010). Yet, this research has paid little attention to the specific strategies of political
steering of experts. The concept of “political” or “strategic” use of knowledge has also proven
difficult to operationalize and study empirically (Christensen, 2020). We argue that studying
these dynamics in terms of government “control” offers a more concrete and researchable
approach.
By contrast, a number of specific studies of expert groups and advisory commissions have
taken interest in the question of control, pointing to situations where expert groups have been
appointed to validate political preferences and legitimize controversial decisions (Ashfort, 1990;
Salter, 1988), structured and mandated in ways that limit commissions' leeway to present inde-
pendent recommendations and evidence (Hunter & Boswell, 2015), and ignored due to politi-
cally ill-received recommendations (Bulmer, 1981; Inwood & Johns, 2016). Yet, much of this
literature relies on single, in-depth case studies of a small set of cases (Inwood, 2005; Prasser &
Tracey, 2014; Rowe & McAllister, 2006) or study expert groups appointed within specific policy
areas, such as financial issues or immigration (Hunter & Boswell, 2015; Marier, 2009;
Owens, 2015). Moreover, the conceptualization of control motives, and how they shape govern-
ment actions vis-à-vis experts, varies substantially across the different studies and according to
the specific case(s) under scrutiny. Going beyond these studies, we apply a theoretical frame-
work and empirical strategy that enable systematic assessment of the mechanisms and preva-
lence of government control across a larger set of commissions and policy areas.
In the next section, we develop some broad expectations about whether and how govern-
ments control expert groups, inspired primarily by arguments from delegation scholarship.
More precisely, we conceptualize the relationship as a principal-agent (PA) relationship, and
rely on the understanding of control as presented in studies of delegation to public and quasi-
governmental bodies (Lewis, 2011; Strøm, 2000). At its core, this framework presumes that an
agency problem arises when a principal delegates tasks to an agent who has interests and incen-
tives that are incompatible with those of the principal. To limit the extent to which agents act
in ways that conflict with government intentions, politicians attempt to control agents in vari-
ous ways (Epstein & O'Halloran, 1999).
We believe that the PA lens offers a fruitful point of departure for analyzing the relationship
between government and expert advisory groups. First, the relationship involves a delegation
problem: Governments (principal) delegate the task of analyzing a policy issue to expert groups
(agent) that have expertise about the problem at hand, but thereby face the risk that
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commissions will recommend policies that deviate from the government's policy preferences.
(Note that in this relationship, the agent is the expert group and not the individual expert.) Sec-
ond, the relationship is contractual, as expert groups have to adhere to the terms of reference
written by government. In many cases, the delegation is also revocable: expert groups may be dis-
continued at the discretion of government. Third, the PA framework provides analytically distin-
guishable and empirically measurable concepts of control that have so far been missing in studies
of expert groups. The framework has also proven useful to illuminate politico-administrative con-
trol with other arm's length technocratic bodies whose rationale is to commit decision making to
expert recommendations, such as independent regulatory agencies and central banks (Thatcher &
Sweet, 2002, p. 3; Elgie & McMenamin, 2005; Ennser-Jedenastik, 2014). Certainly, unlike these
bodies, expert groups are not delegated independent authority to implement policy or to preside
over public budgets, meaning that the risks associated with the delegation may be less pronounced.
Nonetheless, there are several reasons to suspect that governments will be motivated to control
them. In the following section, we develop these expectations in greater detail.
3 | CONTROL WITH EXPERT GROUPS
3.1 | Who controls? Political and administrative principals
Although often not explicated in the literature, a significant feature of many expert groups is that
they face two principals: politicians and bureaucrats. Expert groups are often de facto attached to
the government bureaucracy—for example, a ministry—rather than directly to elected officials. As
such, bureaucrats in the appointing ministry and the Cabinet serve as a conjoined principal. We
argue that both principals will take an interest in controlling expert groups.
For politicians, asking expert bodies for advice carries both potential benefits and risks.
An obvious benefit is getting access to knowledge that can help government improve and
knowledge-base decisions (Bawn, 1995; Gailmard & Patty, 2007). There are also benefits for
the legitimacy of policies: opposition parties, the public and stakeholders may be more
likely to accept policies based on impartial expertise rather than partisan premises
(Hesstvedt & Christiansen, 2021). Furthermore, delegating policy preparation to expert bod-
ies removes some source of temptation from politicians, as expert groups conduct policy
preparation independently of election cycles (Greasley & Hanretty, 2016). Yet, there are also
considerable risks involved. Outside experts may have different ideas than governing parties
about what the problem is and what constitutes appropriate solutions, which may undercut
the government's policy agenda or even lend support to the proposals of the opposition.
Although politicians could risk jeopardizing the benefits of independent expert advice, they
may therefore seek to control expert groups to avoid unwanted policy proposals.
Bureaucrats face a similar trade-off. According to the bureaucratic politics literature, gov-
ernment departments have goals and policy preferences of their own and constantly engage in
power battles to realize these preferences (Allison & Halperin, 1972). Government departments
are therefore interested in knowledge input from external experts both to support the prepara-
tion of ministry policies and to lend legitimacy to these policies. Yet, they may be wary of pro-
posals that go against the established outlook and policy preferences of the ministry. In other
words, bureaucrats also have reasons to control expert groups. For instance, studies have found
finance ministries in various countries to actively steer the activities of expert commissions
(Christensen, 2017; Gilad et al., 2018).
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3.2 | Control by what means? Ex ante versus ex post control
From the delegation literature, we know that principals can limit preference divergence ex ante,
that is, before any action actually has taken place by the agent, by means of strategic design. Ex
post control strategies entail ongoing corrections to the agent's actions, by monitoring and
direct interventions.
We expect politicians to rely on ex ante strategies and to avoid ex post control of expert
groups. Overt political interventions can easily be seen as interfering with objective expert
deliberations. As it is crucial that expert bodies are perceived as independent and apolitical,
this kind of ex post control can thus imperil the legitimacy and credibility benefits of delega-
tion (Greasley & Hanretty, 2016). Moreover, external participants, such as academics, do not
depend on government for their careers or livelihoods and can blow the whistle if politicians
try to meddle in group deliberations. Ex ante strategies are more discreet, by making sure
that the preferences of politicians and expert groups are aligned from the start. This can be
achieved by screening and strategically selecting candidates, or by formulating the terms of
reference in ways that narrow the expert groups' scope of inquiry.
By contrast, we expect bureaucrats to mostly correct commissions in their ongoing work.
The bureaucracy's role vis-à-vis commissions is much more ambiguous than politicians' role.
Civil servants may themselves participate on commissions as subject-matter experts and can be
viewed as providers of neutral information about the administrative feasibility of proposals. If
bureaucrats attempt to steer the work of expert bodies, this may be justified with reference to
their knowledge and professional experience. This ambiguity provides bureaucrats with consid-
erable room for maneuver in exercising control, and the legitimacy costs of ex post interven-
tions are lower than for politicians.
Our first two expectations are therefore that politicians will control expert groups predomi-
nantly by design, and less so by interventions (Proposition 1), whereas bureaucrats will seek to
steer commissions by intervention, and less so by design (Proposition 2).
3.3 | Control under what conditions? Portfolio saliency and ministry
strength
Lastly, political and bureaucratic control may vary across policy portfolios and ministries. First,
we expect politicians to take particular interest in controlling salient policy portfolios. From the
party politics literature, we know that politicians care more about cost-intensive, cross-cutting
and publicly salient policy portfolios, such as the finance and economy portfolios, and take less
interest in policy areas that attract little public attention and prestige, such as the sports or tour-
ism portfolios (Druckman & Warwick, 2005). Furthermore, from the agency literature, we
know that politicians are more concerned about avoiding agency loss and tend to limit agency
discretion in salient policy areas (Calvert et al., 1989). Transposed to expert groups, our third
proposition is thus that politicians will control expert groups in politically salient policy areas
more than expert groups in other areas (Proposition 3).
Second, for bureaucratic principals, control can be expected to vary based on the strength of
the ministry. Strong ministries, for example, a finance ministry, may seek to defend a status
quo that is based on the policy orientation of the ministry, and will therefore be especially inter-
ested in avoiding that expert groups propose policies that diverge from the ministry line. More-
over, strong ministries have more resources that allow them to actually impose control,
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including greater in-house expertise capacities that help them steer discussions in expert
groups. By contrast, weak ministries, for example, a ministry of equal opportunities, have less
of a stake in the status quo and will be less concerned about the risk that expert policy proposals
differ from the ministry's preferences. We therefore expect that strong ministries will exert more
bureaucratic control over expert groups than weak ministries (Proposition 4).
4 | RESEARCH SETTING: NORWAY AND AD HOC
ADVISORY COMMISSIONS
This article examines control with expert bodies through an analysis of Norwegian ad hoc
advisory commissions (Norges offentlige utredninger—NOU). Norway has a knowledge-
intensive policymaking tradition, with a merit bureaucracy and strong reliance on academic
expertise in policy preparation. Advisory commissions have been characterized as a “corner-
stone” of this governance model (Arter, 2008; Christensen & Holst, 2017). Commissions and
their expert members have had considerable impact on Norwegian public policy, setting the
direction for, for example, market-oriented tax reform, New Public Management reforms of
the energy, telecom, and postal sectors, or revisions of school curricula (Christensen, 2017;
Lie & Venneslan, 2010).
Appointed by Cabinet, the task of commissions is to inquire into a specific policy problem
and recommend solutions. Upon appointment, the government formulates the terms of refer-
ence, which serves as the contract between the appointing government and the commission,
defining the mission and tasks of the commission. The government also appoints a chairperson
and members, and assigns the commission a secretariat. The chairperson manages the work,
deliberations, and progress of the commission, and coordinates with the secretariat, which sup-
ports the commission's work. Commission members can be bureaucrats, academics, interest
group representatives, politicians, citizens, or others, but commissions must have balanced gen-
der representation and are expected to be broadly geographically representative. At the end of
its work, the commission delivers a public advisory report with policy recommendations and is
then dissolved. The report is usually sent out for a public hearing (remiss). Governments often
use the report as basis for the formulation of specific policy proposals, which are then submitted
as white papers or propositions to parliament.
Importantly, the commission system is regulated by a set of executive guidelines that place
the power to control commissions with the Cabinet and ministries. Formally, it is up to the sit-
ting cabinet and relevant ministry to appoint and design a commission ex ante. Parliamentary
approval is not required, and the government can choose to constitute a commission if a policy
problem “has significant economic or administrative consequences” or “concerns significant
fundamental or political questions” (Office of the Prime Minister, 2018, p. 5). The responsible
minister and ministry prepare the terms of reference and member composition, which are then
discussed by the Cabinet in government conferences and officially approved by the Council of
State (Ministry of Finance, 2016; Office of the Prime Minister, 2018). Regarding ex post control,
the Guide for the Work of Public Commissions (Ministry of Local Government and
Modernization, 2019) describes best practices for commission work, but does not establish for-
mal rules about the conduct of officials on commissions. In other words, there are few legal
constraints on ex ante and ex post control, and politicians and bureaucrats have leeway to enact
control if they should wish so.
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5 | RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA
5.1 | Mixed-methods design
This article investigates how and under what conditions expert groups are subjected to politico-
administrative control using a mixed-methods research design (Seawright, 2016). To provide a
robust assessment of the propositions, 26 in-depth interviews are triangulated with an original
data set of more than 400 expert commissions.
Our strategy can be described as follows. First, we conducted interviews with civil servants
and academics who had experience as members or secretaries of commissions. Information
given by the interviewees about politico-administrative control was then structured and coded
according to the controlling principal (political vs. bureaucratic) and stage of control (ex ante
vs. ex post). Second, to examine whether these observations were observable at the population
level, we proceeded with a quantitative mapping of control mechanisms mentioned in the inter-
views. Here, we were able to examine three specific control mechanisms (see description
below).
In other words, the qualitative analysis has an exploratory purpose that enables us to chart
the control mechanisms and to make preliminary inferences about the patterns of control. The
purpose of the quantitative analysis is to corroborate the validity of these observations at the
population level, as well as to examine whether there is systematic variation across ministries
and policy portfolios. Explicating the research strategy in a mixed-methods design vocabulary
(cf. Hendren et al., 2018), data collection was conducted in a two-step sequence2
(qualitative ! quantitative), where the qualitative part forms the dominant part of the analysis
(for a similar research design, see Chetkovich, 2003).
The benefit of this design is that we are able to take advantage of both methodologies'
strengths and avoid some of their limitations. While a constraint with qualitative methods is
the difficulty to report estimates of uncertainty, which limits the possibility to draw generaliz-
able conclusions, quantitative studies are often restrained by a limited ability to grasp underly-
ing mechanisms (King et al., 1994). By combining our findings from in-depth interviews with
rigorous examination of the same relationships based on large-N data, we can both uncover the
mechanisms of politico-administrative control and draw conclusions at the aggregate level
about the extent to which and in what situations these instruments are used.
5.2 | Qualitative analysis: Data and coding
The interview sampling strategy was based on the following criteria. First, we focused on two
types of participants: academics and researchers at independent research institutes, and minis-
terial civil servants who were either involved in the process of setting up a commission and/or
participated as members or secretaries. Second, we sampled persons with experience from mul-
tiple commissions. Most interviewees had experience from at least two commissions after 1990,
of which at least one had to be appointed after year 2000. Third, to examine policy area varia-
tion, we conducted interviews with participants appointed by seven different ministries that
vary in strength and in the extent to which they manage politically salient policy portfolios. The
ministries were (1) Finance, (2) Justice, (3) Labor and Social Affairs, (4) Health, (5) Commerce,
(6) Education, and (7) Culture. According to Druckman and Warwick's (2005, p. 41) ratings of
portfolio salience in Norway, finance is a highly salient portfolio, whereas the culture portfolio
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has very low salience. The other portfolios are of medium salience, with Social Services and
Health scoring somewhat higher than the rest. This overlaps with the strength of ministries in
Norway, where the Ministry of Finance is considered the most powerful and the Ministry of
Culture is regarded as a weak ministry (Lie & Venneslan, 2010). The overlap between portfolio
salience and ministry strength does not create a problem in our analysis, since the two features
are expected to have an impact on different dependent variables—political and bureaucratic
control—which we examine separately in our analysis.
In total, we conducted semi-structured interviews with 11 academics and 15 civil servants.
Each interview was carried out by one of the authors and lasted on average 1 h 15 min. We
asked general questions about the commission's work, set-up, output and its relations to the
appointing ministry, the incumbent minister and sitting government. Interviews were tran-
scribed and quotes were coded in Nvivo. The complete file with coded quotes according to our
control scheme is available upon request.
5.3 | Quantitative analysis: Data and coding
In the quantitative analysis, the commission population is ad hoc commissions that submitted a
report between 1990 and 2018 and that included at least one academic member.3 The commis-
sion data set was gathered by manually reading and coding online versions of commission
reports.4 We first registered names, professional titles and institutional affiliations of all mem-
bers and secretaries, and classified them according to their affiliation (academics, bureaucrats,
etc.). Civil servants were also classified by their ministry employment and rank, and academics
according to the number of commissions they had previously participated on. The total number
of commissions, members and secretaries per ministry can be reviewed in Table 1. Among com-
mission participants, academics made up 48 percent of chairpersons, 26 percent of members
and 6 percent of secretaries on commissions, whereas ministry civil servants accounted for 4 per-
cent of chairpersons, 10 percent of members and 63 percent of secretaries (see Supporting Infor-
mation, Table A1).
In the analysis, we study three control instruments for substantive and pragmatic reasons: Sev-
eral of our informants mentioned them in the interviews, and we were able to measure them with
information in our data set. The measures do not cover all control aspects and they are not the
only possible measures; yet, we believe they tap into core elements of control with expert groups.
We operationalize the control instruments in the following way. First, informants observed
that politicians sometimes select academic experts based on partisan considerations. For exam-
ple, we were told that left-leaning governments tend to consult academics with experience from
commissions of previous left-leaning governments, and vice versa for the Centre-right. As a
measure of political control, we therefore count the number of academics on a given commis-
sion that have been appointed previously to commissions by one political bloc only (we label
these “reoccurring experts”). To construct this variable, we first identified academics that
appeared multiple times in the commission system. Appointments were then coded according
to the political bloc that initiated the commission. Among the academics appointed multiple
times to commissions, we code as reoccurring experts those who had only participated on com-
missions appointed by left-leaning governments (i.e. they were never consulted by center-right
governments) or who had only participated on commissions appointed by center-right govern-
ments (never consulted by left-leaning governments). The number of reoccurring experts per
commission is the first dependent variable in our quantitative analysis.
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Second, interviewees mentioned that the bureaucracy controls commissions by appointing
civil servants from the responsible ministry to the secretariat, and by appointing top bureau-
crats as commission members. Bureaucratic control is therefore operationalized by two separate
count variables: (a) The number of secretaries in a commission who are bureaucrats from the
appointing ministry, (b) The number of high-ranking bureaucrats among the members of a
commission, with high-ranking official referring to principal officers, deputy director generals,
assistant director generals, director generals and secretary generals. These variables are the sec-
ond and third dependent variables in the quantitative analysis. All variables are measured at
the level of the commission.
In the results section, we report descriptive figures showing the prevalence of control instru-
ments. We also examine the effect of policy portfolios and ministries in a set of regression
models, where the three outcome variables are regressed with dummies for each of the seven
ministries. One regression is modeled per dependent variable and ministry dummy, including
controls. As the dependent variables are over-dispersed count variables, negative binominal
regressions are applied (King, 1988). Supporting Information Table A2 shows the descriptive
statistics for the variables, including controls.
6 | RESULTS: QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS
6.1 | Political control
It is really fashionable among politicians to talk about ‘knowledge-based pol-
icymaking’. Well, I didn't know that this very often means that you have a political
standpoint and then you find research that fits this standpoint, and not the other
way around. There is a considerable degree of cherry-picking (Interview 5, 2019)
This quote—from a bureaucrat with experience from multiple appointment processes and
secretariats—reflects an impression that many of our informants had. While politicians take
interest in having a solid knowledge basis for their policy proposals, they also tend to care about
whether a commission presents politically palatable proposals. Our material revealed that they
attempted to achieve this in the following ways.
TABLE 1 Number of commissions, members and secretaries, per ministry
Ministry Commissions Members Secretaries
Finance 75 692 395
Labor and social affairs 31 267 128
Health 45 528 118
Justice 70 570 164
Commerce 22 204 65
Education 41 493 172
Culture 15 156 33
Ministries, rest or missing 114 1156 377
Total 413 4066 1452
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As anticipated, politicians are wary about directly intervening in commission work. In
fact, none of our informants in the civil service could recall that a minister or other political
actors had attempted to directly intervene or communicate with a commission while it was
active. For instance, one civil servant stated: “I have worked with many commissions, and I
have never experienced political meddling in the work of a commission” (Interview
12A, 2019). Another ministry official explained: “The minister does not come and say how
things should be done while the commission is working” (Interview 18, 2016).
In contrast, we were told that politicians control ex ante by defining the terms of reference
and member composition. Formally, it is up to Cabinet to decide the terms of reference and
composition of a commission. And according to several civil servants, both aspects are often dis-
cussed in the Cabinet's weekly and informal Cabinet lunches.
First, politicians often seek to formulate the mandates in ways that restrict expert
groups' scope of inquiry: “You can say that political concerns were safeguarded through the
mandate that was given”, as one interviewee put it (Interview 12A, 2019). For instance, a
civil servant in the Ministry of Health observed that politicians set the direction by defining
“concretely which alternatives to look at … The commission was asked to assess whether a
policy program should be continued … so it was pretty explicit that we were supposed to
propose cuts” (Interview 7, 2019). The terms of reference can thus be politically colored: “If
the Christian People's Party had been in government, it would maybe have been formulated
differently” (Interview 22, 2016) and “I reckon that the mandate would have looked differ-
ent with a different kind of government” (Interview 6, 2019), two informants related.
Second, informants observed that politicians sometimes strategically select members
and the chairperson. While academic credentials and expertise were important, politicians
were also concerned about whether the expert could provide politically palatable advice.
Some also pointed to the importance of political affinity with the sitting government. A
researcher with experience from several commissions stated that the selection of experts
was “a combination of input from the bureaucracy, which has good knowledge about who
is an expert in the field, and concrete suggestions from politicians, who wanted their own
people on the commission” (Interview 1, 2019). Other informants related that “the commis-
sion included people that had a political background as part of their CV” (Interview
12B, 2019) and that “[The minister] wanted to find people who were connected to the Pro-
gress Party … The minister wanted to calm tensions within the party” (Interview 21, 2016).
Others noted that politicians tended to prefer members and experts that they knew on a
personal or professional level: “Too many know each other from before. I think that is wor-
risome … But in a small country like Norway, I guess it is difficult to avoid” (Interview
6, 2019).
Lastly, informants pointed to policy area variation. An academic who participated on a
commission under the Ministry of Culture, for example related that “I think they [politi-
cians] took little interest in the issue… Cultural policy is generally an issue that attracts little
political attention” (Interview 2, 2018). In contrast, several bureaucrats told us that politi-
cians were more eager to control policy areas with substantial financial costs: “This [welfare
policy] is a very politicized policy area… It is a very costly policy area. They [the Ministry of
Labor and Social Affairs] have gigantic budgets” (Interview 5, 2019). Informants appointed
by the Ministry of Finance also explained: “[Political control with commissions] depends on
the ministry … The Ministry of Finance manages one third of the National budget.”
(Interview 7, 2019).
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6.2 | Bureaucratic control
The interviews revealed that not only politicians take an interest in controlling commissions.
Bureaucrats also seek to reduce the chances that commissions diverge from the ministry line.
However, in contrast to politicians, bureaucrats tend to use both ex ante and ex post
instruments.
First, the mandate is an important design instrument for civil servants. Bureaucrats draft
the first proposal before it is sent to ministers, and often have strong views about what the man-
date should include. As one academic member observed: “The design of the mandate to a great
extent happens in the ministry. It is an important instrument of power” (Interview 23, 2016).
Another informant described how the Ministry of Finance would steer the commission through
the mandate “based on what they wanted from the commission … it is kind of a ‘the questions
you ask determine the answers you get’ way of thinking” (Interview 5, 2019).
Second, the bureaucracy wields considerable influence over member composition. The
bureaucracy usually presents the first list of names before any political involvement. When
selecting experts, academic merits and competence are important, and gender and geographical
representation also need to be taken into account. But we were also told that bureaucrats con-
sider whether external actors share the ministry's views. For instance, one informant described
the Ministry of Finance's approach as follows: “A ‘downside’ is that a commission can arrive at
something that the Ministry of Finance does not agree with. They are worried that a commis-
sion will say something else than what they want. Therefore, they are concerned about what
the mandate says and who chairs the commission” (Interview 17, 2016).
Third, it emerged from our interviews that the secretariat is a particularly important bureau-
cratic control instrument. In contrast to the terms of reference and member composition, the
appointing ministry decides the composition of the secretariat. The secretariat usually does
much of the actual writing of the report, in addition to gathering information and data. This
setup gives the secretariat considerable leverage over commission work.
For example, we were told that ministries staff secretariats with their own officials.
While most academics emphasized that the bureaucratic secretaries were valuable resources
due to their subject-matter knowledge, they also pointed to considerable tensions. There
were numerous examples of civil servant secretaries who actively intervened in the expert
commissions' work. For instance, academics noted that the secretariat was very active in
pushing its agenda (Interview 24, 2016) and had strong opinions about what kind of recom-
mendations the commission should arrive at (Interview 11, 2019). As one informant
explained: “[I]f we didn't go exactly in the direction that he [the secretary] wanted, he
would come and say that it should be like this or like that” (Interview 11, 2019). Several
researchers also experienced that the secretariat made changes to the manuscript without
seeking approval:
The chapter was edited by the secretariat between our meetings, and major parts of
the text had been changed. Some of the things that we [the members] had agreed
upon were deleted from the text, while new things were added. [And then I won-
dered:] Who had really decided this? (Interview 1, 2019)
An academic chairing a commission appointed by the Ministry of Finance even experienced
that the secretariat resisted direction and instead acted according to the wishes of the ministry:
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I had major problems with the secretariat from the ministry. When I told them that
they were to follow my instructions and act in another role [as secretaries loyal to the
commission and not the ministry], they got furious. … In my opinion, the secretariat
should not be located in the ministry. As long as the ministry controls the secretariat,
they have a huge influence on commissions' output. (Interview 16, 2015)
Furthermore, top bureaucrats that are appointed as members hold an ambiguous role. A top
bureaucrat in the Ministry of Finance related that “there was a perception within the commis-
sion that I was a representative of the ministry, but I was also there as an expert” (Interview
10). Another informant said that “the member from the ministry presented the view of the min-
istry … he was there to keep watch” (Interview 17, 2016). This dual role seemed to confuse sev-
eral of the experts, who found it “challenging” that high-ranking civil servants were
represented on the commission (Interview 1, 2019). “It's a problem that you don't know when
the member is speaking for himself and when he is speaking on behalf of the ministry,” as
another informant put it (Interview 23, 2016).
Lastly, as many of the quotes reported so far illustrate, the Ministry of Finance displayed
particularly active control behavior. For instance, one civil servant described that: “In the Min-
istry of Finance, the principle is that the ministry has a representative on the commission, who
has the right to speak and make proposals. If the secretariat thinks that things are going wrong,
they will tell the ministry's representative” (Interview 21, 2016). Informants also reported active
control behavior from other ministries, such as the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs. For
instance, one civil servant described that “when we have had people in secretariats appointed
by the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, they have come back rather frustrated and have felt
that they have been pretty controlled” (Interview 5, 2019).
7 | RESULTS: QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
7.1 | Political control: Reappointment of academics
In the interviews, it was revealed that politicians sometimes cherry-pick experts to ensure control
with commissions' recommendations. Figure 1 shows the average number of reoccurring experts
per commission, in general and per ministry portfolio. Recall that a reoccurring expert is defined as
an academic that is appointed to commissions multiple times by one political bloc only. In the bar to
the left, we see that commissions on average included 0.57 reoccurring experts. If we consider that
the total number of academics per commission is 2.55 on average, this means that more than one
fifth of academics on commissions were reoccurring experts—which is a substantial share. Yet, it
also means that many commissions were not subjected to ex ante political control by this measure.
Furthermore, we see that commissions under the Education portfolio on average contain the most
reoccurring experts, whereas commissions under the Culture and Commerce portfolios contain the
fewest reoccurring experts.
Next, the results from the regression analysis of the relationship between policy portfolio
and the number of reoccurring experts per commission are visualized in Figure 2 (see
Supporting Information, Table A3 for regression table). In the regression, we control for the
total number of academics per commission. To some extent, the figure corroborates the qualita-
tive findings: Commissions appointed by the Ministry of Finance include significantly more
reoccurring experts (i.e. appointed only by the left or only by the right) than commissions under
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FIGURE 1 Average number of reoccurring academics, per commission. Average across all commissions
(left) and per ministry (right)
FIGURE 2 Political control: The relationship between policy portfolios and the number of reoccurring
experts per commission. Notes: Visualization of seven negative binominal regressions. Coefficients on Y-axis.
Ten percent confidence intervals
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other ministries. By contrast, commissions under the Culture portfolio include significantly less
reoccurring experts. However, for the Labor and Social Welfare portfolio, the relationship is
negative, opposite to what we anticipated after the interviews.
7.2 | Bureaucratic control: Appointment of civil servants to
commissions and secretariats
To measure bureaucratic control, Figure 3 shows the average number of top ministerial bureau-
crats and secretaries from the appointing ministry per commission. The left-hand side of the fig-
ure shows that nearly two secretaries (1.72) per commission are employed in the appointing
ministry. This is substantial, both in absolute terms and considering that the total number of
secretaries is 3.5 on average. In comparison, top bureaucrats participate less frequently as com-
mission members (0.53 per commission). To the right, we see that the Ministry of Finance
appoints the greatest number of their own staff to secretariats and high-ranking civil servants
as commission members, whereas the Ministry of Culture appoints the fewest.
Figures 4 and 5 examine the relationship between ministries and the two measures of
bureaucratic control, visualizing the results of the regression analyses (see Supporting Informa-
tion, Tables A4 and A5 for regression tables). In Figure 4, we control for the total number of
secretaries per commission; in Figure 5, for the number of members per commission. The pat-
terns corroborate the interviews: As visualized by the positive and significant correlation, com-
missions reporting to the Ministry of Finance include a significantly greater number of both
FIGURE 3 Average number of top civil servants and secretaries from the appointing ministry, per
commission. Average across all commissions (left) and per ministry (right)
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secretaries from the ministry and of high-ranking bureaucrats as commission members. By con-
trast, the Ministry of Culture uses these control instruments less than other ministries, although
only one of the negative effects is significant. Although the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs
displays positive effects as expected, it is not significantly different from other ministries.
FIGURE 4 Bureaucratic control: The relationship between ministries and the number of secretaries from the
appointing ministry per commission. Notes: Visualization of seven negative binominal regressions. Coefficients
on Y-axis. Ten percent confidence intervals
FIGURE 5 Bureaucratic control: The relationship between ministries and the number of high-ranking civil
servants among commission members per commission. Notes: visualization of seven negative binominal
regressions. Coefficients on Y-axis. Ten percent confidence intervals
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8 | DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Our mixed-methods study of Norwegian advisory commissions produces important insights and
new empirical knowledge about politico-administrative control of expert groups.
First, our analysis has shown that while both politicians and bureaucrats seek to control
expert groups, control strategies differ. The bureaucracy both sets the direction for commissions
ex ante through the design of the mandate, composition and secretariat, and intervenes ex post
through their commission participation if the group veers off course. Although several external
experts grumbled about this active control behavior, bureaucrats were rarely called out in pub-
lic for meddling in commission work. We suggest that this had to do with bureaucrats exploi-
ting the ambiguity of their role: Bureaucrats' subject-matter expertise blurs the line between
informative guidance and advocacy for the ministry's interests. By contrast, we find that politi-
cians attempt to limit the chances of receiving politically unwanted advice by framing the man-
dates or by selecting experts who are both academically merited and sympathetic to the
government's views. Yet, once the expert group is appointed, politicians refrain from interven-
ing. This could have been otherwise: Formally, there is nothing that impedes politicians from
intervening. Yet, it seems that politicians consider the legitimacy costs of intervention to be too
high. These patterns largely confirm our theoretical expectations, although bureaucrats were
more active in strategically designing expert groups than we anticipated.
Second, our study has uncovered systematic differences in control across policy portfolios.
Most notably, expert groups under the Ministry of Finance were subject to significantly greater
political and bureaucratic control than expert groups in other policy areas, whereas groups
under the Ministry of Culture were less likely to be controlled by politicians and bureaucrats.
We suggest that the this can be explained by differences in portfolio salience and ministry
strength: Whereas the economic/finance policy area is highly salient and the Ministry of
Finance has a strong position in the state apparatus and considerable in-house analytical capac-
ities (Lie & Venneslan, 2010), the Ministry of Culture handles a low-salience area and is near
the bottom of the ministerial pecking order. However, our empirical analysis does not allow us
to draw strong conclusions about the factors that account for this variation, and as we discuss
below, other explanations are possible.
Our study provides several contributions to existing literature. First, it goes beyond the oft-
repeated argument in work on knowledge utilization that expertise can be used in political and
strategic ways, by showing by whom, how, and when expert groups are used politically and stra-
tegically. Second, our mixed-methods analysis improves on previous small-n studies of expert
commissions, not only by examining close-up the instruments of political and bureaucratic con-
trol over expert groups but also by providing systematic evidence for the use of these control
instruments across commissions and policy areas. Third, our study adds to the delegation litera-
ture by extending principal-agent arguments to a new phenomenon, namely expert arrange-
ments whose rationale is to provide knowledge and policy recommendations. The article
thereby opens up a new research agenda at the intersection of public administration and knowl-
edge and policymaking, which hopefully will stimulate more systematic research on how politi-
cians and administrators control the many expert groups, commissions and task forces active at
the national and international levels.
Our study also has important limits. Whereas our study investigates control strategies, it
does not tell us how successful these control strategies were in influencing commission output
or final policy decisions. Furthermore, our findings from Norway cannot automatically be gen-
eralized to other political systems. An important scope condition for our argument is that the
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Norwegian administrative system is merit-based. This may imply that expert groups in Norway
are controlled less than in other systems. In a merit-based system, bureaucrats may share the
educational background and professional worldviews of external experts, which could make
their preferences well aligned. Norwegian politicians, who operate within a political culture of
merit-based decision making, may also be less inclined to intervene than in other systems. Yet,
a merit-based bureaucracy may also make control over expert groups more likely, since bureau-
crats can reasonably pass for experts and politicians may use expert groups to bypass an
independent-minded bureaucracy. Even if the effect of a merit bureaucracy is uncertain, it is
reasonable to believe that our findings will travel better to other merit bureaucracies, for exam-
ple, other Northern European countries, than to countries with more politicized bureaucracies,
such as the United States, Italy, or Spain.
Our study also does not consider other relevant differences between commissions, policy
areas, and issues that may affect control. First, control may depend on the internal composi-
tion of expert groups, such as the relative shares of academics and societal stakeholders.
Additional analyses do not show any significant differences in bureaucratic control between
commissions with many and few academics (see Supporting Information, Table A6). Since
our data set only includes commissions with at least one academic, it is not suited for ana-
lyzing the effect of stakeholder participation on control. Yet, this is an important question
for further research.
Second, control may depend on the scientific disciplines represented on expert groups. Poli-
ticians may face major knowledge asymmetries when dealing with expert professions that use
analytical models that are inaccessible to outsiders, such as economists' formal modeling and
sophisticated econometrics or epidemiologists' models of how a virus spreads. From a PA per-
spective, this knowledge asymmetry would make political control more difficult. But one could
also speculate that politicians, anticipating this knowledge dependence, would seek tighter ex
ante control. Bureaucrats—especially in specialist merit bureaucracies—would not face the
same disadvantage in dealing with academic experts since they themselves often have training
in the same field.
Third, in policy areas that are characterized by high complexity, great uncertainty and
wicked problems, principals may not have fixed preferences or understandings but rather a gen-
uine need to learn from experts with unique knowledge about the problem. That principals seek
to learn from experts is well accepted in principal-agent scholarship, which argues that the
greater the technical uncertainty, the greater the gain from delegating to specialized experts
and the lower the degree of control (Bawn, 1995). However, complexity and uncertainty do not
remove the control motive altogether: principals will still want to make sure that the recom-
mendations of expert groups do not run counter to policies they support, as seen for example in
the intense politics surrounding expert inquiries into high-uncertainty issues like climate
change or financial crisis.
Fourth, control may depend on the salience of the policy issue rather than the policy area.
Some issues within salient portfolios attract minimal political attention, while some issues that
fall under low-salience portfolios may be “hot topics” that generate great political interest. We
would expect expert groups dealing with more salient issues to face greater political control.
Unfortunately, this relationship is not possible to examine with our data. Yet, future studies
could investigate this empirically by collecting data on how often an issue is mentioned in the
media or parliamentary debates.
Finally, the repeated character of expert groups can matter for control. Politicians and
bureaucrats repeatedly appoint expert groups, and civil servants and academics repeatedly
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interact on commissions. This may favor political and bureaucratic control, since principals
can sanction experts by reappointing academics who proved sympathetic to the political or
ministry line and de-select researchers who had conflicting views. This may give rise to
tight-knit policymaking networks of bureaucrats and researchers, that support a specific
understanding of problems and solutions and keep alternative experts and perspectives out.
Further exploring this dynamic aspect of control is an exciting avenue for research.
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1 https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=faq.faq&aide=2, accessed April 2020.
2 We conducted pilot interviews in 2015/2016, gathered the dataset in 2017, and conducted the rest of the inter-
views in 2018/2019.
3 The government also appointed a number of corporatist commissions without academics in this period, which
we exclude from our analysis.
4 www.regjeringen.no/en/find-document/norwegian-official-report.
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